## AMENDMENT TO THE CLAIMS

- (Currently Amended) A cryptographic method, including:
  - generating, at a first entity, a first public key  $M_{\rm B}$ , the first public key  $M_{\rm B}$  being session specific;
  - receiving, at the first entity, a second public key  $M_A$ , the second public key  $M_A$  being session specific;
  - generating, at the first entity, a first secret  $S_B$  using a combining equal to a sequence of hash functions  $f_B$  on applied to at least a first password  $P_B$ , the first public key  $M_B$ , and the second public key  $M_A$ ;
  - generating, at the first entity, a first session key  $K_B$ , the first session key  $K_B$  being different from the first secret  $S_B$ , both the first session key  $K_B$  and the first secret  $S_B$  being computed from the second public key  $M_A$ ;
  - encrypting, at the first entity, a first random nonce N<sub>B</sub> with the first session key K<sub>B</sub> or the first secret S<sub>B</sub> to obtain a first encrypted result, the first random nonce N<sub>B</sub> being unrelated to both K<sub>G</sub> and S<sub>B</sub>:
  - encrypting, at the first entity, the first encrypted result with the other one of the first session key  $K_B$  or the first secret  $S_B$  to obtain an encrypted random nonce; transmitting the encrypted random nonce from the first entity to the second entity; receiving a response to the encrypted random nonce; and
  - authenticating through determining whether the response includes a correct modification of the first random nonce N<sub>B</sub>.
- (Canceled)
- (Previously Presented) The method of claim 1 wherein authenticating through determining whether the response includes a correct modification includes: checking whether a received modification of the first random nonce N<sub>B</sub> equals a modification of the first random nonce N<sub>B</sub> applied by the first entity.

- 4. (Previously Presented) The method of claim 1 wherein said authenticating includes: checking whether a received modification of the first random nonce less a modification thereof as applied thereto by the first entity equals the first random nonce.
- (Previously Presented) The method of claim 1 wherein generating the first session key K<sub>B</sub> includes:

generating a first random number  $R_B$ , and computing the first session key  $K_B$  from the second public key  $M_A$  raised to the exponential power of the first random number  $R_B$ , modulo a parameter  $B_B$ .

## 6-7. (Canceled)

- (Previously Presented) The method of claim 1 wherein said generating the first secret S<sub>B</sub> includes:
  - combining the second public key  $M_A$  and the first public key  $M_B$  with a first password  $P_B$  to produce a first result, and
  - hashing the first result with a secure hash.
- 9. (Original) The method of claim 8 wherein the secure hash is a one-way hash function.
- (Original) The method of claim 9 wherein the one-way hash function is one of the Secure
  Hash Algorithm, the Message Digest 5, Snefru, Nippon Telephone and Telegraph Hash,
  and the Gosudarstvennyl Standard.
- 11. (Previously Presented) The method of claim 1 wherein said generating the first secret S<sub>B</sub> includes:
  - combining a first password  $P_B$  and at least one of the second public key  $M_A$  and the first public key  $M_B$  to generate a first combined result, and
  - combining the first combined result and at least one of the second public key M<sub>A</sub>, the first password P<sub>B</sub>, and the first public key M<sub>B</sub> to generate a second combined result.

- (Previously Presented) The method of claim 1 wherein the first random nonce N<sub>B</sub> is encrypted using a symmetrical encryption algorithm.
- (Original) The method of claim 12, wherein the symmetrical encryption algorithm is one
  of the Data Encryption Standard and the block cipher CAST.
- (Previously Presented) The method of claim 1 wherein encrypting the first random nonce Nn includes superencrypting the first random nonce Nn.
- 15. (Previously Presented) The method of claim 14, wherein superencrypting the first random nonce N<sub>B</sub> includes: encrypting the first random nonce N<sub>B</sub> with the first secret S<sub>B</sub> to produce the first encrypted

encrypting the first encrypted result using the first session key K<sub>B</sub>.

result: and

- 16. (Previously Presented) The method of claim 15 wherein said authenticating includes: decrypting the response using the first session key  $K_{\rm B}$  to generate a first decrypted result; and
  - decrypting the first decrypted result using the first secret  $S_{\rm B}. \label{eq:secret}$
- 17. (Previously Presented) The method of claim 1, wherein the response includes a combination of a second random nonce N<sub>A</sub> and a modification of the first random nonce; and wherein the method further includes:

extracting the second random nonce NA from the response;

modifying the second random nonce  $N_A$  to obtain a modified second random nonce; encrypting the modified second random nonce using the first session key  $K_B$  and the first

secret S<sub>B</sub> to obtain an encrypted package; and

transmitting the encrypted package from the first entity.

- 18. (Previously Presented) The method of claim 17 wherein said encrypting the modified second random nonce includes:
  - generating a string of random bits IB;
  - encrypting a combination of the string of random bits  $I_B$  and the modified second random nonce using the first secret  $S_B$  to generate a first result; and
  - encrypting the first result using the first session key KB.
- (Previously Presented) The method of claim 17 wherein the encrypted package is transmitted for authentication of the first entity in opening a two-way communication channel.
- (Currently Amended) A computer readable storage medium containing executable
  computer program instructions which, when executed, cause a first computer system to
  perform a cryptographic method including:
  - generating, at the first computer system, a first public key  $M_B$ , the first public key  $M_B$  being session specific;
  - receiving, at the first computer system, a second public key  $M_A$ , the second public key  $M_A$  being session specific;
  - generating, at the first computer system, a first secret  $S_B$ -using a combining equal to a sequence of hash functions applied to function  $f_B$ -on-at least a first password  $P_B$ , the first public key  $M_B$ , and the second public key  $M_A$ ;
  - generating, at the first computer system, a first session key  $K_B$ , the first session key  $K_B$  being different from the first secret  $S_B$ , both the first session key  $K_B$  and the first secret  $S_B$  being computed from the second public key  $M_A$ ;
  - encrypting, at the first computer system, a first random nonce  $N_B$  with the first session key  $K_B$  or the first secret  $S_B$  to obtain a first encrypted result, the first random nonce  $N_B$  being unrelated to both  $K_B$  and  $S_B$ ;
  - encrypting, at the first computer system, the first encrypted result with the other one of the first session key K<sub>B</sub> or the first secret S<sub>B</sub> to obtain an encrypted random nonce;
  - transmitting the encrypted random nonce from the first computer system to the second computer system; and

- authenticating through determining whether a response to the encrypted random nonce includes a correct modification of the first random nonce  $N_B$ .
- 21. (Currently Amended) A distributed readable storage medium containing executable computer program instructions which, when executed, cause a first computer system and a second computer system to perform a computer cryptographic method through a network, the method comprising:
  - generating at the first computer system a first public key  $M_B$ , the first public key  $M_B$  being session specific;
  - generating at the second computer system a second public key  $M_A$ , the second public key  $M_A$  being session specific;
  - receiving at the first computer system the second public key MA;
  - generating, at the first computer system, a first secret  $S_B$  using a combining function  $f_B$  on-equal to a sequence of hash functions applied to at least a first password  $P_B$ , the first public key  $M_B$ , and the second public key  $M_A$ ;
  - generating at the first computer system a session key  $K_B$ , the session key  $K_B$  being different from the first secret  $S_B$ , both the session key  $K_B$  and the first secret  $S_B$  being computed from the second public key  $M_A$ ;
  - generating at the first computer system a first random nonce N<sub>B</sub>, the first random nonce

    N<sub>B</sub>, being unrelated to both K<sub>B</sub>, and S<sub>B</sub>;
  - encrypting at the first computer system the first random nonce  $N_B$  with the first session  $\ker K_B$  or the first secret  $S_B$  to obtain a first encrypted result;
  - encrypting at the first computer system the first encrypted result with the other one of the first session key K<sub>B</sub> or the first secret S<sub>B</sub> to obtain an encrypted random nonce;
  - transmitting the encrypted random nonce and the first public key  $M_B$  from the first computer system to the second computer system to establish the session key at the second computer system;
  - receiving at the first computer system from the second computer system a response to the encrypted random nonce; and

- authenticating the second computer system at the first computer system through determining whether the response includes a correct modification of the first random nonce Nn.
- (Currently Amended) A computer system for performing a cryptographic method through a network, the computer system comprising:
  - a processor;
  - a network interface coupled to the network and coupled to the processor, the network interface to receive a request including information on a user identification; and
  - a storage device coupled to the processor, the storage device to store a user password corresponding to the user identification, and wherein the processor is to perform a method, including:
    - receiving a second public key  $M_{\Lambda}$  through the network interface, the second public key  $M_{\Lambda}$  being session specific;
    - generating, at the first computer system, a first secret  $S_B$  using a combining  $\frac{function f_B \text{ on equal to a sequence of hash functions applied to at least a}{first password P_B, the first public key <math>M_B$ , and the second public key  $M_A$ ;
    - generating a first session key  $K_B$ , the session key  $K_B$  being different from the first secret  $S_B$ , both the session key  $K_B$  and the first secret  $S_B$  being computed from the second public key  $M_A$ ;
    - generating a first public key  $M_B$ , the first public key  $M_B$  being session specific; generating a first random nonce  $N_B$ , the first random nonce  $N_B$ , being unrelated to both  $K_B$  and  $S_B$ :
    - encrypting the first random nonce  $N_B$  with the session key  $K_B$  or the first secret  $S_B$  to obtain a first encrypted result;
    - encrypting the first encrypted result with the other one of the session key K<sub>B</sub> or the first secret S<sub>B</sub> to obtain an encrypted random nonce;
    - transmitting the encrypted random nonce and the first public key  $M_B$  through the network interface:
    - authenticating through determining whether a response to the encrypted random nonce includes a correct modification of the first random nonce.

- 23. (Previously Presented) The computer system of claim 22 wherein the network is a network operating according to a hypertext transfer protocol; and the first public key M<sub>B</sub> is transmitted with the encrypted random nonce for session key exchange.
- (Currently Amended) A cryptographic method, comprising:
   receiving at a first entity a second public key M<sub>A</sub> and an encrypted second random

number:

- generating a first secret  $S_B$  using a combining function  $f_B$ -on-equal to a sequence of has functions applied to at least a first password  $P_B$ , a first public key  $M_B$ , and the second public key  $M_A$ ;
- generating a first session key  $K_B$ , the session key  $K_B$  being different from the first secret  $S_B$ , both the session key  $K_B$  and the first secret  $S_B$  being computed from the second public key  $M_{\Lambda}$ ;
- decrypting, using the first secret  $S_B$  and the first session key  $K_B$ , to retrieve a second random number  $N_A$  from the encrypted second random number;
- modifying the second random number  $N_A$  to obtain a modified second random number; encrypting the modified second random number with the first session key  $K_B$  or the first secret  $S_B$  to obtain a first encrypted result, the modified second random number being unrelated to both  $K_B$  and  $S_B$ ;
- encrypting the first encrypted result with the other one of the first session key  $K_B$  or the first secret  $S_B$  to obtain an encrypted random package; and transmitting the encrypted random package from the first entity.
- 25. (Previously Presented) The method of claim 24, wherein said decrypting includes: decrypting the encrypted second random number using the first session key K<sub>B</sub> to generate the first decrypted result; and decrypting the first decrypted result using at least a first password P<sub>B</sub> and the second public key M<sub>A</sub>.
- 26. (Previously Presented) The method of claim 24 wherein said generating the first session key  $K_{\rm B}$  includes:

generating a first random number  $R_B$ , and computing the first session key  $K_B$  from the second public key  $M_A$  raised to the exponential power of the first random number  $R_B$ , modulo a parameter  $B_B$ .

## 27-28. (Canceled)

- 29. (Previously Presented) The method of claim 24 wherein said generating the first secret S<sub>B</sub> includes: combining the first public key M<sub>B</sub> with the first password P<sub>B</sub> to produce a first result, and hashing the first result with a secure hash.
- 30. (Original) The method of claim 29 wherein the secure hash is a one-way hash function.
- (Original) The method of claim 30 wherein the one-way hash function is one of the Secure Hash Algorithm, the Message Digest 5, Snefru, Nippon Telephone and Telegraph Hash, and the Gosudarstvennyl Standard.
- (Previously Presented) The method of claim 24 wherein said generating the first secret S<sub>B</sub> includes:
  - combining the first password  $P_B$  and the first public key  $M_B$  to generate a first combined result, and
  - combining the first combined result and at least one of the second public key  $M_A$ , the first password  $P_B$ , and the first public key  $M_B$  to generate the first secret  $S_B$ .
- (Previously Presented) The method of claim 24, wherein said encrypting the modified second random number includes superencrypting the modified second random number.
- (Previously Presented) The method of claim 24, further including: generating a first random number N<sub>B</sub>; and wherein said encrypting the modified second random number includes:

- encrypting a combination of the first random number  $N_{\text{B}}$  and the modified second random number.
- 35. (Previously Presented) The method of claim 34 which further includes:
  - receiving at the first entity a response to the encrypted random package;
  - decrypting the response to obtain a combination of a string of random bits and a modified first random nonce; and
  - retrieving the modified first random nonce from the combination of the string of random bits and the modified first random nonce:
  - determining whether the modified first random nonce was correctly modified from the first random number  $N_{\rm B}$ .
- 36. (Previously Presented) The method of claim 35 wherein said determining whether the modified first random nonce was correctly modified includes:
  - checking whether the modified first random nonce equals a modification of the first random nonce as applied to the first random nonce by the first entity.
- 37. (Previously Presented) The method of claim 35 wherein said determining whether the modified first random nonce was correctly modified includes:
  - checking whether the modified first random nonce less a modification thereof as applied thereto by the first entity equals the first random nonce.
- 38. (Currently Amended) A computer readable storage medium containing executable computer program instructions which, when executed, cause a first computer system to perform a cryptographic method including:
  - receiving at the first computer system a second public key  $M_A$  and an encrypted second random number:
  - generating a first secret  $S_B$ -using a combining function  $f_B$  on equal to a sequence of hash functions applied to at least a first password  $P_B$ , a first public key  $M_B$ , and the second public key  $M_A$ ;

- generating a first session key  $K_B$ , the session key  $K_B$  being different from the first secret  $S_B$ , both the session key  $K_B$  and the first secret  $S_B$  being computed from the second public key  $M_A$ ;
- decrypting, using the first secret  $S_B$  and the first session key  $K_B$ , to retrieve the second random number  $N_A$  from the encrypted second random number;
- modifying the second random number  $N_A$  to obtain a modified second random number; encrypting the modified second random number with the first session key  $K_B$  or the first secret  $S_B$  to obtain a first encrypted result, the modified second random number being unrelated to both  $K_B$  and  $S_B$ :
- encrypting the first encrypted result with the other one of the first session key  $K_B$  or the first secret  $S_B$  to obtain an encrypted random package;
- transmitting the encrypted random package from the first computer system for authentication.
- 39. (Currently Amended) A distributed readable storage medium containing executable computer program instructions which, when executed, cause a first computer system and a second computer system to perform a cryptographic method through a network, the method including:
  - receiving, from the second computer system and at the first computer system, a second public key  $M_{\rm A}$  and an encrypted second random number;
  - generating a first secret  $S_B$  using a combining function  $f_B$  on equal to a sequence of hash functions applied to at least a first password  $P_B$ , a first public key  $M_B$ , and the second public key  $M_A$ :
  - generating a first session key  $K_B$ , the session key  $K_B$  being different from the first secret  $S_B$ , both the session key  $K_B$  and the first secret  $S_B$  being computed from the second public key  $M_A$ ;
  - decrypting, using the first secret  $S_B$ , to retrieve a second random number  $N_A$  from the encrypted second random number;
  - modifying the second random number NA to obtain a modified second random number;

- encrypting the modified second random number with the first session key K<sub>B</sub> or the first secret S<sub>B</sub> to obtain a first encrypted result, the modified second random number being unrelated to both K<sub>B</sub> and S<sub>B</sub>;
- encrypting the first encrypted result with the other one of the first session key  $K_B$  or the first secret  $S_B$  to obtain an encrypted random package;
- transmitting the encrypted random package from the first computer system to the second computer system.
- (Currently Amended) A computer system for performing a cryptographic method through a network, the computer system comprising:
  - a processor;
  - a network interface coupled to the network and coupled to the processor, the network interface to receive a request including information on a user identification; and a storage device coupled to the processor, the storage device to store a user password associated with the user identification, and wherein the processor is to perform a method, including
    - generating a first public key MB;
    - receiving a second public key  $M_A$  and an encrypted second random number through the network interface;
    - generating a first secret S<sub>B</sub> using a combining function f<sub>B</sub> on equal to a sequence

      of hash functions applied to at least a first password P<sub>B</sub>, a first public key

      M<sub>B</sub>, and the second public key M<sub>A</sub>;
    - generating a first session key  $K_B$ , the session key  $K_B$  being different from the first secret  $S_B$ , both the session key  $K_B$  and the first secret  $S_B$  being computed from the second public key  $M_A$ ;
    - decrypting, using the first secret  $S_B$  and the first session key  $K_B$ , to retrieve the second random number  $N_A$  from the encrypted second random number;
    - modifying the second random number  $N_A$  to obtain a modified second random number:

encrypting the modified second random number with the first session key K<sub>B</sub> or the first secret S<sub>B</sub> to obtain a first encrypted result, the modified second random number being unrelated to both K<sub>B</sub> and S<sub>B</sub>;

encrypting the first encrypted result with the other one of the first session key  $K_{\rm B}$  or the first secret  $S_{\rm B}$  to obtain an encrypted random package;

transmitting the encrypted random package through the network interface.

41. (Previously Presented) The computer system of claim 40 wherein the network is a network operating according to a hypertext transfer protocol; and the first public key M<sub>B</sub> is transmitted for session key exchange before the encrypted second random number is received.